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Using secondary data, the novelty effect of the opening of 15
new Major League Baseball stadiums was determined. Using
a seven-year period looking both before and after each
stadium’s inaugural season, a meaningful novelty effect was
documented. There were significant increases in attendance
and the average ticket price for each of the 15 teams under
scrutiny. As a consequence, there was a significant increase
in the revenue generated through ticket sales. While the
anticipated spike was in evidence for the year a new stadium
opened, meaningful increases were also documented for the
years subsequent to the opening of the new stadium and the
final year of the old stadium. Thus it might reasonably be
argued that the opening of a new stadium offers two
opportunities on which the team might capitalize – the
novelty effect of the new stadium and the nostalgia effect of
the old stadium.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 1999, fifteen new Major League Baseball (MLB) stadiums have been constructed and opened
for business. A large majority of these new facilities were constructed using some form of public
assistance, a practice that while presumed to be good for the teams, has generated considerable
controversy. This research quantifies the financial impact that new stadiums have on MLB teams by
examining spectator attendance, ticket prices, the Fan Cost Index (FCI), and ticket revenue over a
seven-year period encompassing the year in which each of the new stadiums was opened. The FCI
was used as it goes far beyond the cost of tickets for attending. Specifically, the FCI is defined as the
average aggregate expenditure for a family of four when attending a sporting event (Brown, 2010).
Proponents of using public monies to build new sports facilities cite increases in spending by fans,
the creation of jobs, increases in tax revenues, and a positive impact on community pride. Opponents
counter that spending does not actually increase, rather it simply replaces the money that fans
would otherwise spend on leisure alternatives; furthermore, the jobs created are few and often
temporary, part-time, or seasonal (Roy, 2008). One study actually documented a case where property
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values decreased in a city with a new facility (Dehring, Depken, and Ward, 2007). Thus it has been
argued that while increases in revenues are realized by the team, the anticipated benefits may not
accrue to the community-at-large. So the overriding question is a simple one: how much does the
team benefit by virtue of the opening of a new stadium, irrespective of the sources of funding for the
construction costs?
The focus of the current study is on the gains flowing to the team over a period of time surrounding
the opening of a new stadium. By starting the assessment two years prior to the opening season, the
data capture the approximate time that the new stadium decision is articulated to the public and
construction begins. By continuing for seven years, the new stadium’s apparent impact on
attendance, the cost of attending, and the revenue generated from ticket sales can be measured.
Information of this ilk is undoubtedly important to both the proponents and opponents of public
funding to pay for the construction of a new stadium.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There is an abundance of literature that has focused on attendance at professional sports events.
Obviously, it is not as simple as James Earl Jones’ character, Terrence Mann, made it appear to be
when he uttered the famous line in the popular movie, A Field of Dreams – “If you build it, he will
come.” However, there does appear to be some evidence supporting that premise. This literature
review will address that issue along with other key considerations. It begins with a general overview
of attendance followed by an examination of previous research on ticket prices. It concludes with the
primary focus of this project, namely the impact of a new stadium.
Spectator Attendance
Ticket sales are critical to the success of professional sports teams as it has been reported that they
comprise 20 to 50 percent of the revenue stream for a Major League Baseball, National Football
League, National Basketball Association, or National Hockey League team (Kim and Trail, 2010). In
this regard, consumers in the United States spend an estimated $17.1 billion yearly on tickets to
sporting events (Plunkett, 2008), a figure that makes it one of the country’s largest industries. In
addition to ticket revenue, a variety of associated sources including sales of concessions, souvenir
merchandise, and parking also contribute to a team’s bottom line. Having fans in the seats of a
stadium is more than a financial factor as having a full stadium can enhance the home field
advantage for a team, as well as improve the image of the sports organization when its games are
viewed via one of the various visual media such as television and the Internet.
It is increasingly difficult in today’s sports environment to appeal to fans who are willing to spend
the time and money it takes to attend a live sporting event. Rein, Kotler and Shields (2006) discuss
the elusive fan who is difficult for sporting organizations to attract and retain. The authors discuss
the current dynamic marketplace in which this elusive fan resides. First, there is increased
competition in terms of countless sporting events, with over 600 professional teams and 1,000
collegiate athletic programs in the United States alone (Kim and Trail, 2011) along with new
technology and media with which to view those events. Fans’ expectations are higher with spectators
insisting on instant information via Jumbotron screens, gourmet food, and a thrilling sports
environment. Another factor that could inhibit attendance at live sporting events is the time poverty
which many fans reportedly experience. The average fulltime employee in the American workplace
has a typical workday schedule that consists of 9.2 hours of work, 7.5 of sleep, 0.9 hours of household
activities, 3 hours of leisure (including sports), and 3.4 hours for various other activities including
eating, drinking and shopping. Because of the limited free time that can be spent on leisure
activities, the fans have become more selective as to how their discretionary time is spent.
Furthermore, the recent economic downturn and slow recovery have impacted many fans’ ability to
afford tickets to professional sporting events (Fullerton and Johnson Morgan, 2009). Anecdotal
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evidence of this phenomenon is provided by noting the inability of MLB teams in New York and
Detroit to sell out their early-round games during the 2012 MLB postseason playoffs. And finally,
fans have become more discontented and disconnected with sports organizations because of several
factors. These factors include soaring ticket prices, perceptions that players and teams are more
interested in money than in fans, and the suspicion that sports marketing practices are deceptive,
insensitive, and manipulative (Kim and Trail, 2011).
Many factors can affect the attendance of live sporting events. According to Zhang, Lam, and
Connaughton, (2003) these variables can be grouped into three categories: game attractiveness,
marketing promotions, and economic factors. Game attractiveness encompasses athletic skills, team
records, league standing, record-breaking performance, closeness of competition, team history in the
community, schedule convenience, and stadium quality. Marketing promotions include tactics such
as public relations efforts, special events, entertainment programs, and giveaways. Economic
considerations comprise ticket price, the availability of substitute sporting events and other forms of
entertainment, and the potential spectator’s level of income. In developing and testing a model to
explain factors that motivate or constrain spectator attendance at sporting events, Kim and Trail
(2010) found that attachment to the team explained approximately 21 percent of the variance, lack of
team success explained another 10 percent, and alternative leisure activities explained 3 percent. In
addition, gender seems to have a role; differences in motivations for sporting event attendance have
been documented with men being more influenced by the game itself in terms of arousal and the act
of being a true fan. Women, on the other hand, were found to be more interested in the overall game
experience and the opportunity for socializing during the game (Hall and O’Mahony, 2006).
In examining the frequency of attendance, one study found that there was an hour glass shape
relationship with a large number of fans attending many games (i.e. season ticket holders) and a
large number of fans attending a small number of games. However, very few fans are in the middle
section of that hourglass, a location populated by spectators who attend between 50 and 75 percent
of the team’s home games (Clowes and Tapp, 2003). Therefore, it is essential to cater to the season
ticket holders as a steady and continuing source of ticket revenue. Studies found that there were two
categories of explanations as to why season ticket holders decide to retain or upgrade their seats the
following season. The first category includes the tangible aspects of ticketing service provided while
the second category involves intangible aspects of the experience, including fan identification and
personal involvement (Arnett and Laverie, 2000; Zhang, Connaughton and Vaughn, 2004; McDonald
and Shaw, 2005; McDonald, 2010.) Thus, professional sports organizations are increasingly
providing special programs and services to frequent and loyal fans in the form of financial rewards
(such as discounted tickets and concessions), ensuring that every season ticket holder has direct
access to an account representative, priority in purchasing tickets, opportunities to socialize with
players, coaches and other loyal fans, and enhanced game day experiences and access. In essence,
marketers of spectator sports have begun to embrace the concept of relationship marketing, a
strategy that has come to be known as customer relationship management. Interestingly, there have
been mixed results on whether the team’s performance, as measured by its win/loss record, impacts
season ticket holder retention (Shaw and McDonald, 2005; Ferreira and Bravo, 2007; Fullerton,
2011.) However, one factor in all of the previous studies described above that did not seem to impact
season ticket holder satisfaction or retention was the price of the tickets.
Ticket Pricing
Many factors have been shown to influence the price of a ticket for a professional sporting event.
While many of the standard variables such as the availability of substitute products that fulfill the
same consumer need, and the buyer’s willingness and ability to forgo the purchase do impact ticket
pricing (Fullerton, 2010), sporting events do not necessarily have an elastic demand curve. Higher
ticket prices may be associated with higher rather than lower demand (Fullerton, 2011). Sport fans
are often willing to pay higher prices for perceived higher quality. For example, in 2009 the New
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York Yankees had the highest average ticket prices in MLB, but drew the second largest attendance
for the season (Fullerton, 2011).
One study on the National Football League surveyed pricing administrators of teams and found that
there were several determinants of a team’s pricing structure including: 1) the team’s performance;
2) the revenue needs of the team; 3) public relations issues; 4) the price sensitivity of the market; 5)
fan identification; and 6) the average league ticket price (Reese and Mittelstaedt, 2001). Another
study examined National Football League data to determine factors that explained a team’s increase
in their average ticket price from the previous year. Determinants included: a move to a new
stadium, a change in the win percentage from the previous year, reaching the conference
championship game, and the previous year’s ticket price increase (Rishe and Modello, 2003). Looking
more specifically at MLB, Fullerton (2011) found a strong positive correlation between a team’s
payroll and its average ticket prices; and weaker yet positive correlations between the average ticket
price and both the total season attendance and team’s performance were documented.
A pricing strategy for spectator sports that has received much attention lately is that of variable
pricing in which different pricing levels are used for the same seat for different games depending on
the demand for those games. Pricing levels may vary depending on the time of the year (summer
versus spring or fall), the day of the week, holidays, the quality of the team’s opponents, and the
rivalry between the two competing teams (Maich, 2008). While some authors have claimed that the
strategy involving a uniform price for a particular seat was extremely inefficient and led to scalpers
exploiting the system by charging much higher prices for sold out games (Maich, 2008), empirical
research conducted by Rascher et al. (2007) concluded that average MLB team revenue would
increase less than three percent when using variable pricing over the standard one-price strategy.
An emerging strategy, dynamic pricing, was introduced by the San Francisco Giants for the 2010
season (Young, 2010). This pricing policy allows changes on a minute-by-minute basis thus resulting
in price that specifically addresses the dynamic environment – much the way the airline industry
manipulates prices at will as it seeks to achieve a state of equilibrium where supply equals demand.
A final set of pricing strategies is the result of the downturn in the global economy and its slow
recovery. As a result, many fans are unable to afford expensive tickets to attend professional
sporting events. Therefore aggressive ticket pricing strategies that would have been frowned upon a
few short years ago are now becoming commonplace across the globe (Fullerton and Johnson
Morgan, 2010). These aggressive strategies include the discounting of season tickets, a variety of
promotional pricing initiatives, and an increase in ticket sales via the secondary ticket market.
New Stadiums
Since 1999, fifteen new MLB stadiums have been constructed and opened for business. A large
majority of these new facilities were constructed using some form of public funding, a practice that
while presumed to be good for the teams, has generated considerable controversy. Proponents of
using public monies to build new sports facilities cite an array of positive factors. These factors
include increases in spending by fans, jobs, tax revenues, and community pride. Opponents counter
that spending does not increase per se, rather it simply replaces the money that fans would
otherwise spend on leisure alternatives; furthermore, the jobs created are few and often temporary,
part-time, or seasonal (Roy, 2008). Thus increases in revenues seem to be realized by the team, but
not by the community at large. For this component of the literature review, advantages to both the
professional team and the community will be examined.
New facilities arguably increase the game’s attractiveness, thus increasing attendance and allowing
teams to charge higher ticket prices (New York Times, 2000). Several studies have been conducted to
see if the increase in attendance is enduring or merely a short-lived phenomenon created by the
novelty of the new facility. Clapp and Hakes (2005) examined MLB attendance data from 1974 to
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2002 and found that while there was an increase in attendance of 32 to 37 percent during the
first year of a new stadium, there was a honeymoon effect after which attendance fell back to the
baseline. For older multifunctional stadiums built before 1974, the honeymoon only lasted two
years, but for stadiums built after 1974, it lasted six to ten years. Roy (2008) studied Minor
League Baseball attendance data for the 101 new stadiums built between 1993 and 2004. He
found that stadium attendance increased through the fifth year of the new stadium due to a
novelty effect, albeit growth after year two slowed considerably. For stadiums built to replace
existing facilities, attendance levels were found to be 74 percent higher in year five than they
were during the final season for the old stadium. Results of other studies focusing on attendance
in a new stadium varied with the duration of increased ticket sales ranging between two and
eight years (Coates and Humphreys, 2005; Howard and Crompton, 2003).
Another potential advantage of a new stadium could be an increased home field advantage.
Two studies on the team performance after a professional sporting organization’s moved to a new
facility resulted in mixed findings. Pollard (2002) examined professional baseball, basketball and
hockey teams that moved to new facilities in the same city from 1987 to 2001 and found that
the home advantage in the first year of the new stadium was significantly less than that during
the last year in the old facility. He found the same results for all three sports with an average
decrease in home advantage of 24 percent. However, another study that looked at all four of the
major sports leagues in North America generally documented no significant relationship between
a new venue and the competitive success of the team for three of the four leagues. The
exception was Major League Baseball (Quinn, Bursik, Borick and Raethz, 2003). The authors
surmised that because of the lack of revenue sharing and a hard salary cap, increased
attendance in the new facility results in an increased revenue stream for the team. That
revenue can in-turn be invested in payroll for expensive, but more talented players who
would improve the product on the field of play. That is to say the team will be better and win more
games, a factor which has been shown to attract more fans.
Many of the fifteen new MLB stadiums built since 1999 used public funding for financing.
Multiple studies have been conducted on the economic benefits to the community as a result of
this funding. The majority of the studies found either no net benefits or benefits that were much
smaller than the costs of the new stadiums (see Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000 for a review of
previous studies.) One study actually documented a case where property values decreased in a
city with a new facility (Dehring, Depken and Ward, 2007). Conversely, a more recent study
determined than in eight of nineteen cities that either gained a new professional team or built a
new professional sport facility, there was a rise in the city’s share of the aggregate regional income
(Santo 2007). The author stated that context was important to the financial viability of publicly
funded sports facilities.
However, other studies suggest that the benefit to communities that fund new professional
sports facilities may not just be financial. Other advantages may be building a more cohesive
community, developing iconic architecture, and revitalization via urban development. A case study
of Cincinnati by Smith and Ingham (2003) suggests that the benefit of developing a lasting sense of
community did not occur in that city. Town meetings revealed schisms between social classes, those
who lived in the city versus those who lived in the suburbs, and between fans and non-fans. The
authors suggest that rather than generate a community spirit, public subsidization of a
professional sports team may have even further divided residents. However, a study from Germany
suggests that using innovative and iconic architecture in new sports facilities could indeed help
support area development by improving the image of a community and becoming a destination
attraction to visitors (Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2010).
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
There are four primary objectives associated with this study. The initial objective is that of
determining the impact that a new MLB stadium has on attendance over a seven-year period
encompassing its opening. Second is that of determining the extent to which the opening of a new
stadium coincides with changes in the cost of attending an MLB game – expressed both in terms of
the average cost of a ticket and the average cost for a family of four to enjoy a game while making
the common expenditures on food, beverages, souvenirs, programs, and parking. This metric is based
on the commonly recognized Fan Cost Index (FCI). The third objective involves the desire to estimate
the extent to which the new stadium contributes to an infusion of additional revenue to the team.
Any increase is simply a function of increased attendance and higher ticket prices. The final
objective is one of gaining an understanding of the discrepancy in the impact of the novelty effect for
a typical small market team and a typical large market team.
METHODOLOGY
All data were acquired from two reputable secondary data sources with the cost data extracted from
reports on www.teammarketing.com and attendance data gleaned from www.MLB.com. Attendance,
the average price of tickets, and the FCI were gathered over a seven-year period for all 15 MLB
teams that opened a new stadium between 1999 and 2012. That seven-year period began two
seasons prior to the opening of the new stadium and continued through the fifth season in which
games were played in the new stadium. While the average ticket price and the FCI have been shown
to be highly correlated (Fullerton, 2010), the FCI is a much more inclusive measure that estimates
the total cost of attending for a family of four. When examining ticket prices and the FCI, two
perspectives were addressed. Actual dollar amounts were used as one basis for determining the
extent of the relationship between costs and the presence of a new stadium. However, since the
period under observation covered 13 years, it was appropriate to consider the impact of general
inflation. Thus, using the April CPI for each year from 1999 through 2012, all cost data were
adjusted to reflect real dollars using 2009 as the base year.
Means were calculated for the nominal and real values of the average ticket price and the FCI over
the aforementioned seven-year period. Where ticket revenue estimates were used, the average ticket
price was multiplied by the corresponding measure for attendance. Differences across the means
provided insight regarding the impact that a new stadium has on attendance, the cost of attending,
and the corresponding level of revenue generated by selling tickets to all 81 home games over the
course of a 162 game MLB season. These differences are expressed in terms of percentage increases
or decreases for each of the metrics under scrutiny.
RESULTS
The initial assessment addressed changes in attendance over the seven-year period surrounding the
opening of the new stadium. A short-term spike in attendance is evident. Interestingly, there are two
spikes for most teams – one in the last year of the old stadium and a significantly larger spike the
year the new stadium opened. The year prior to the opening is marked by a 4.1 percent increase in
attendance while an increase of 15.1 percent is achieved during the inaugural season. This is
generally followed by declines in each of the two following seasons. On average, these declines are
4.8 percent and 6.3 percent respectively. Interestingly, years four and five in the new stadium are
characterized by increases in attendance. Specifically, a modest 2.4 percent increase is documented
for year four and a somewhat more robust increase of 6.3 percent is associated with year five. Of
note, however, is the reality that the attendance for each of the four years following the inaugural
season in the new stadium is lower than the year it opened. A somewhat different perspective of the
effect of a new stadium is to examine the change in attendance between the two seasons marking the
beginning and end of this assessment period. In other words, how much did attendance increase
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between the season two years prior to the opening of the new stadium and the fifth year of playing in
that stadium. For the stadiums under scrutiny, the documented increase was an average of 16.3
percent. Table 1 summarizes these results.
Table 1
Attendance over Time
Year Relative to Stadium Opening
Attendance
Two-years prior
2,346,477.13
One-year prior
2,443,454.40
Year stadium opened
2,812,344.13
Second year
2,677,716.93
Third year
2,508,149.50
Fourth year
2,567,306.15
Fifth year
2,730,049.91

Change from Prior Season
N/A
+4.1
+ 15.1
- 4.8
- 6.3
+2.4
+6.3

It has long been surmised that new stadiums translate into higher prices being paid by fans of the
teams that call the new stadiums home. In the current study, the relationships documented in this
regard – specifically the average price of a ticket and the Fan Cost Index – are similar to those
documented for attendance. As can be seen in Table 2, there is a small bump for the final year of the
old stadium followed by a larger surge for the inaugural season; then the cost curve appears to level
off prior to starting a slight downward slide for the last two years under scrutiny. This trend is true
both for ticket prices and for the FCI. The increases in ticket prices for the two seasons leading into
and including the opening of the new stadium are 12.7 and 35.2 percent respectively whereas year
two in the new stadium is marked by a slight increase of 2.5 percent. The downward trend starts
with year three of the new stadium with a slight reduction in ticket prices of 2.3 percent followed by
more substantial decreases of 4.4 percent and 5.7 percent to end the seven-year period of the
financial assessment. Despite the decreases in ticket prices later in the time period under scrutiny,
the prices for tickets to MLB games in these new stadiums were almost 37.6 percent more expensive
at the end of the seven-year period than they were at the beginning. Similar results are in evidence
when the FCI is scrutinized. Increases of 7.0 and 22.1 percent mark the year before and the year of
the stadium’s opening followed by increases of 2.0 percent and 1.2 percent in the two subsequent
years. The final two years under scrutiny exhibited declines in the FCI of 2.9 and 5.8 percent
respectively. Still, the increase in the FCI over the seven-year window was a substantial 23.4
percent. It is also worth noting that the reduction in the FCI in years four and five were, to a great
extent, driven by the reduced ticket prices. Despite this modest decline in the FCI, it is apparent that
the prices for venue-specific purchases such as concessions rose slightly upon the opening of the new
stadium. In light of these increases, it is likely that the per cap revenue increased appreciably. Table
2 provides an overview of these results.
Table 2
Cost Factors (Nominal Dollars) over Time
Year Relative to Stadium Opening
Mean Ticket Price
Two-years prior
$17.09
19.26
One-year prior
Year stadium opened
26.04
Second year
26.69
Third year
26.08
24.94
Fourth year
Fifth year
23.51

Mean FCI
$142.94
152.96
186.77
190.49
192.76
187.22
176.39
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Given the varying timelines associated with the 15 stadiums, it was decided that comparisons would
be more generalizable if the two cost criteria were indexed so as to eliminate the impact of general
inflation. This was accomplished by using CPI data with 2009 serving as the base year. The April
statistics were used so as to coincide with the start of the Major League Baseball season. With the
impact of inflation accounted for, the results differed somewhat from those where the nominal data
were used. Specifically, ticket prices rose 10.3 percent the year prior to the opening of the stadium;
this was followed by a robust 32.9 percent increase for the inaugural season. Interestingly, a modest
increase of 1.2 percent was in evidence for the second season in the new venue. Following these
increases, the final three years under scrutiny in this study, seasons three through five in the new
stadium, exhibited decreases in the price of the average ticket – expressed in adjusted real dollars –
of 5.7, 3.6, and 7.7 percent respectively. Again, a comparison of the real ticket prices at the inception
and terminal years of the seven-year period documents an increase of 24.3 percent. Similar results
were in evidence when the FCI was scrutinized. At 4.6 and 19.5 percent, the increases for the year
preceding the move to the new stadium and the inaugural season were more modest than were the
corresponding increases in ticket prices. However, the FCI continued to rise the year after the
stadium opened, albeit the increase was a modest 1.1 percent. Year three in the new stadium
marked the inception of a downward trend in the real cost of attending a game. Specifically, the
decreases were 1.9, 3.6, and 5.3 percent respectively. Even though significant decreases were in
evidence over the final three years under scrutiny, it can be seen that the FCI grew at a rate 13.3
percent over the seven-year period. Table 3 summarizes the corresponding mean values using
adjusted dollars with 2009 as the base year.
Table 3
Cost Factors (Real (Adjusted) Dollars) over Time
Year Relative to Stadium Opening
Mean Ticket Price
Two-years prior
$19.51
21.52
One-year prior
Year stadium opened
28.60
Second year
28.93
Third year
27.27
26.29
Fourth year
Fifth year
24.26

Mean FCI___
$164.16
171.77
205.28
207.60
203.68
196.30
185.93

DISCUSSION
Regarding attendance, sports marketers are often simply viewed as being responsible for putting
“butts in the seats.” For 12 of the 15 teams that moved into a new stadium between 1999 and 2012, a
noteworthy increase in attendance was in evidence. This statistic rightfully delineates the fact that
three teams experienced a decrease in attendance during their new stadium’s inaugural season. This
can be attributed to the fact that the Cardinals, Mets, and Yankees all moved into new stadiums
with lower seating capacities. So even if a game was sold out during the initial season of the new
stadium, there may well have been fewer fans in the seats for that game in comparison to a similarly
sold out game played during the final season in the old stadium. Thus the average attendance for the
inaugural seasons for the 15 teams would likely have been even higher had the size constraint
associated with the three stadiums not been a factor. And while some may view any decrease in
attendance as a negative outcome, the reality is that despite the lower attendance, even these three
teams experienced significant increases in their ticket revenue.
Annual team revenue from the sale of tickets was estimated by multiplying average attendance by
the indexed average ticket price for a given year. It is important to acknowledge that a team’s
average ticket price does not include premium tickets such as luxury suites and premium seats such
as the $1,250 seats behind home plate at the new Yankee Stadium. It also does not consider
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sponsorship revenue or the fees paid to the team for broadcast rights. However, it does provide a
metric that can serve as a means of comparison and as a measure of growth. Regarding ticket
revenue, the results emanating from this study indicate that a sizable increase is associated with a
new stadium. Most noteworthy is the inaugural season where the average revenue from ticket sales
of $80,421,791 reflects a 53 percent increase over the revenue generated from that same source for
the final season in the old stadium. And that figure is on top of the growth of 14.8 percent associated
with the revenue derived from ticket sales during the final season in the old stadium. Although
revenue decreased for each of the four years following the inaugural season, it still reflects a
significant increase over that which was generated during the season two years prior to the opening
of the new stadium. As a testament to this reality, the revenue in year seven of this assessment
period exhibited a 44.6 percent increase over the revenue from this same source during the first
season covered by the seven-year assessment period, that is to say two seasons prior to play
beginning in the new stadium. Table 4 summarizes these results.
Table 4
Average Ticket Revenue (Real (Adjusted) Dollars) over Time
Year Relative to
Revenue
Δ from Previous Year
Two-years prior
$ 45,787,511
N/A
One-year prior
$ 52,578,251
+14.8%
Year stadium opened
$ 80,421,791
+53.0%
$ 77,456,710
Second year
- 3.7%
$ 72,551,735
Third year
- 6.3%
Fourth year
- 7.0%
$ 67,486,521
$ 66,221,182
Fifth year
- 1.9%

Δ from Year One__
N/A
+14.8%
+75.6%
+69.2%
+58.4%
+47.4%
+44.6%

From a Team Perspective: Two examples of the Impact of a New Stadium
The impact of the novelty effect is better illustrated with examples of individual team results.
Because of the distinction drawn between large market teams and small market teams, a decision
was made to examine the results for two teams – one that falls into each category. This illustration
of the actual impact will delineate the financial gains from ticket revenue for the San Diego Padres
and the Philadelphia Phillies. Each team opened its new stadium in 2004 meaning that data for all
seven years are available. Furthermore, San Diego has been designated a small market team
whereas Philadelphia is deemed to be a large market team (Jones, 2010). This assessment will begin
with an overview of the results over the seven-year timeframe for the San Diego Padres.
A look at the novelty effect for the San Diego Padres
The spike that was documented for the aggregate analysis for the fifteen stadiums is not in evidence
for the year prior to the opening of the new stadium in San Diego. As the aggregate results would
lead us to expect, a modest increase in the average ticket price was in evidence; however, the allure
of the old Jack Murphy Stadium did not attract a flurry of attendees. In fact, attendance declined by
almost 200,000 (-8.7%), so even with the modest increase in ticket prices, the ticket revenue for the
year prior to the new stadium’s opening actually decreased by 4.6 percent from the previous year. As
a result, this source of revenue produced almost two million dollars less than it did two years prior to
the unveiling of the new Petco Park. The opening of the new park coincided with an increase of
almost 30 percent in the average price for a ticket to a Padres’ game. Yet almost a million more
spectators made their way through the turnstiles. The result was a 91.9 percent increase in ticket
revenue. Thus there appears to be a significant novelty effect for the year that the stadium opened.
Then prices dropped as did attendance for the following year. Still, the ticket revenue generated for
each of the four years exceeded that same metric for the season two years prior to the stadium’s
opening by an average of 58.6 percent or some 23.5 million dollars. While other variables may have
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intervened to impact these increases, it seems fair to assert the premise that a novelty effect is in
evidence. Table 5 summarizes the novelty effect for Petco Park over the seven-year timeframe for the
current study. When looking at Table 5, it is important to recall that all monetary figures are
indexed and represent values expressed in terms of the dollar in 2009.
Table 5
Novelty Effect over Time for the San Diego Padres’ New Stadium
Year Relative to Opening
Ticket Price
Attendance Ticket Revenue
$18.02
Two-years prior (2002)
2,220,416
$40,011,896
One-year prior (2003)
$18.83
2,027,020
$38,168,786
Year stadium opened (2004)
$24.28
3,016,752
$73,246,738
Second year (2005)
$22.82
2,869,787
$65,488,539
Third year (2006)
$22.04
2,659,754
$58,620,978
$22.83
2,790,074
$63,697,389
Fourth year (2007)
Fifth year (2008)
$27.23
2,427,535
$66,101,778
A look at the novelty effect for the Philadelphia Phillies
The pre-opening spike was in evidence for the year prior to the opening of the new Citizens Bank
Park in Philadelphia. Ticket prices rose a sizable 10.6 percent, or slightly more than the overall
industry average of 10.1 percent for the 15 new stadiums. The increase in attendance was far more
pronounced. While the overall average increase for the 15 teams was 4.1 percent, the Phillies’
attendance increased by a robust 37.7 percent. By virtue of these two increases, ticket revenue
jumped 54.4%. This compares quite favorably to the composite average of 14.8 percent for the 15
teams. As dramatic as these results were, the novelty effect associated with the opening of the new
stadium in Philadelphia was even more pronounced. Ticket prices rose by 47.9 percent and
attendance surged 43.8 percent. The result emanating from these two increases was a corresponding
doubling of ticket revenue from the previous year. To be precise, ticket revenue rose by
approximately 112.7 percent. Following this spike, ticket prices, attendance, and revenue all
decreased the next season. During year three of the new stadium, ticket prices dropped in real terms.
And despite a slight increase in attendance, the revenue generated from ticket sales experienced a
slight decline. And while ticket prices continued their modest decline, attendance and revenue both
began to rebound. Novelty effect is most certainly in evidence for the new stadium in Philadelphia.
Table 6 provides an overview of these results.
Table 6
Novelty Effect over Time for the Philadelphia Phillies’ New Stadium
Year Relative to Opening
Ticket Price
Attendance Ticket Revenue___
Two-years prior (2002)
$18.09
1,618,141
$29,272,170
2,259,903
$45,198,060
$20.00
One-year prior (2003)
$29.58
Year stadium opened (2004)
3,250,092
$96,137,721
Second year (2005)
$29.12
2,665,307
$77,613,739
Third year (2006)
$28.28
2,701,815
$76,407,328
Fourth year (2007)
$28.11
3,108,325
$87,375,015
Fifth year (2008)
$27.93
3,422,583
$95,592,743
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IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKETING PRACTITIONERS
This research has supported the premise that new stadiums lead to higher prices associated with
attending an MLB game. This is true for both the average ticket price and the Fan Cost Index.
Interestingly, the bump prior to the opening of the new stadium is sizable, perhaps due to increased
interest in visiting a venerable old stadium before it is razed and/or because of the home team’s use
of nostalgia-based promotions.
We have seen studies that refer to the novelty, honeymoon, or halo effect which presumes that a new
stadium will serve as a factor that may well usurp performance as a motive for attending an MLB
game. What has not been discussed in any depth is the apparent nostalgia effect of the old stadium.
In this regard, the sentiment attached to the old stadium will serve to attract spectators who want
one last chance to experience the old stadium before it is reduced to rubble. Clearly, this nostalgia
effect is inextricably tied to the level of attachment that the fans have with the old stadium. Just as
clearly, this attachment is related to the age of the old stadium. The New York Yankees had the
opportunity to capitalize on the nostalgia effect when closing old Yankee Stadium. Conversely, when
the Pirates announced the decision to move from Three Rivers Stadium, the impact was not as
substantial. The Yankees were well aware of both the nostalgia and novelty effects. Prior to the final
season in the old stadium, the team sent glossy, four-color promotional booklets reflecting back on
the old stadium and encouraging known ticket buyers to take advantage of the final opportunity to
enjoy a game in the House that Ruth Built. The next year, a similar promotion was directed to the
same segment of ticket buyers highlighting the opportunity to be a part of the new tradition. Thus it
is evident that the Yankees sought to capitalize on both the novelty and the nostalgia effects. Based
on the belief that a nostalgia effect would influence consumer sentiment, ticket prices were raised by
37.3 percent. Despite this sizable increase, attendance still rose, albeit by a modest .65 percent. This
combination of increases produced almost 49 million dollars in additional ticket revenue which
represented an increase of approximately 38.2 percent over the previous year. Conversely, the
average ticket price for the Pirates rose a modest 4.3 percent while attendance rose by 6.8 percent.
The net increase in revenue from ticket sales was just over 2.6 million dollars, an increase of 11.3
percent. So while nostalgia effect is in evidence, it has been shown to vary significantly from one
stadium to another. While saying this, it is important to note that with a 150 percent increase in
ticket revenue, the novelty effect associated with the opening of the new PNC Park in Pittsburgh
was significant. Management of any franchise considering a move to a new stadium should be aware
of the scope of their opportunity to capitalize on the nostalgia effect. But there is a caveat. Clearly,
that opportunity is more substantial for the Boston Red Sox than for the Tampa Bay Rays.
The revenue projections calculated for this study consider only ticket sales for the traditional gate;
they do not include premium seating or other revenue sources such as revenue from stadium naming
rights, revenue from sponsorships and in-stadium advertising, or the fees paid for broadcast rights.
Each of these can be substantial and should be taken into account when contemplating the move to a
new stadium. Furthermore, management needs to consider the potential increases in the per cap
revenue derived from the sales of other venue-specific products such as food, beverages, programs,
parking, and souvenirs created by virtue of the novelty and nostalgia effects.
The results of this study specifically address Major League Baseball. Yet there is anecdotal evidence
that the novelty effect is a consideration for new stadiums in a number of other sports environments.
Minor League Baseball’s Pensacola Blue Wahoos saw their average attendance more than quadruple
with the opening of a new state-of-the-art stadium (albeit there was a concurrent move up to AA
baseball from an independent league). Other sports have benefitted from this novelty effect including
the National Football League, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League;
however, the novelty effect is primarily derived from more expensive tickets and the sale of souvenirs
given that many teams in these three leagues routinely operate close to, if not exceeding, published
capacity, and several of the NFL teams have actually moved to new stadiums with lower seating
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capacities. So while the novelty effect may appear to be more relevant for baseball, opportunities in
other sports should be explored.
While there are critics regarding Team Marketing Reports’ estimates of a team’s average ticket price
and its corresponding Fan Cost Index, there can be no disputing the changes in attendance.
Management needs to consider the potential nostalgia and novelty effects on attendance for the
scenario where they are considering a new stadium, and they should use that insight to develop a
pricing strategy that will take advantage of the opportunities that a new stadium along with the
closing of an older facility will present.
By definition, novelty and nostalgia effects should be considered temporary. While a nostalgia effect
may be present for the year prior to the stadium’s opening, it may not be substantial if there is not
some reasonable degree of attachment associated with the existing facility. Furthermore, the length
of the novelty effect is subject to question. This novelty will wear thin fairly quickly if the team fails
to perform. In this regard, there is likely to be a synergistic effect when the opening of a new stadium
is coupled with improved performance by the home team. To this point in time, however, the current
study has assessed novelty effect solely as a function of the opening of the new stadium. In reality it
is not that simple; it is in fact a multivariate environment. Estimations of future demand, which are
inextricably tied to the teams’ pricing strategies, need to move to a more inclusive multivariate
analysis which would allow the new stadium to be just one of the independent variables employed.
Other variables such as the acquisition or loss of a star player and an anticipated change in
performance as measured by wins are but two factors that should be taken into account. In this
regard, the new software germane to dynamic pricing can have a significant role when considering
single-game tickets. However, the impact of these variables must be taken into account when
establishing prices for season tickets, many of which are purchased months in advance of the start of
the new season.
New sports stadiums and arenas are expensive. As a case in point, consider the soon to be opened
NFL stadium that will play host to the New York Jets and the New York Giants. Its estimated
construction cost is some $1.6 billion (Lacayo, 2009). Despite these rising costs, the findings of this
study support a team’s rationale for building a new stadium. However, they also support the critics’
concerns regarding the use of tax monies to offset costs that they would prefer to see incurred by the
franchise owners. Given the substantial increase in revenue that has been documented, questions
will be raised as to the wisdom of a government entity’s investment of scarce resources in a way that
is viewed as subsidizing billionaire team owners. Given this trepidation on the part of taxpayers and
the corresponding reluctance of many lawmakers to alienate their constituents, a convincing
argument needs to be articulated. Among the key talking points in this regard is the fact that sports
teams provide a meaningful economic impact to the community. And unlike the novelty effect, this
impact should be viewed as a long-term positive contribution that is worth the investment.
CONCLUSIONS
This research documents an important reality. A new stadium represents a viable tool in an MLB
team’s quest to increase attendance and revenue. It quantifies the positive effects both before and
after the new stadium opens. In this regard, it is evident that there is a novelty effect associated
with the new stadium and a corresponding nostalgia effect for the old one. So while the research
provides an economic rationale for supporting the decision to build a new stadium, it also provides
credence to social commentary that opposes taxpayer-funded stadiums. Given the increased per cap
revenue, it is argued that owners should view new stadiums as investments that will produce
meaningful returns. Yet those returns may be short-lived; as the novelty wears off, fans will likely
consider other factors such as team performance in making the decision whether or not to attend a
game and whether an MLB ticket represents a reasonably-priced entertainment option. The
argument is not likely to end soon.
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